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In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to
make decisions that set directions for the organization, employ subordinates
and contract with external suppliers. This paper explains when such del-
egation of authority can be optimal, using a model of a ﬁrm with three
parties: the principal, the manager and the worker. In centralization with
two two-tier hierarchies, the principal designs contracts for both agents.
In delegation with a three-tier hierarchy, the principal directly contracts
with a delegated agent who, in turn, contracts with the other agent. We
identify an environment where the principal can beneﬁt from delegating au-
thority to the manager, but not to the worker. Beneﬁcial delegation arises
endogenously when delegation motivates the manager to acquire valuable
information, which is used for better decision-making and more eﬃcient
incentive provision to the worker. We also show how total surplus is dis-
tributed in delegation vis-` a-vis centralization, document comparative statics
results regarding the beneﬁts of delegation and the distribution of total sur-
plus, and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization.
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01. Introduction
The so-called separation of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Fama and Jensen,
1983) refers to the fact that the nominal owners of corporations - shareholders - delegate
authority to managers. The authority is vested in several important dimensions for the top
managers of corporations. They make executive decisions that set directions for corporations,
employ subordinates and contract with external suppliers. This multiple dimension of au-
thority is a deciding factor for the organizational form of corporations. Rather than a set of
two-tier hierarchies in which owners are at the top of each two-tier hierarchy, modern corpora-
tions are often organized as multi-tier hierarchies.(1) Chandler (1977, 1990) attributes such a
transformation of family-oriented “personal capitalism” to “managerial capitalism” in the US
to a sharp increase in demand for, and supply of professional, qualiﬁed managers as corpora-
tions become larger with increasingly sophisticated operations. The resulting modern business
enterprise, according to Chandler, is an organization with many distinct operating units that
are managed by a hierarchy of professional, salaried executives. In such organizations, share-
holders hire top managers - through boards - and managers, in turn, hire subordinates or
contract with external suppliers. Why are such multi-tier hierarchies, rather than multiple
two-tier hierarchies, often the norm? Why are managers, instead of other stakeholders, at the
center of the multi-tier hierarchy? This study attempts to provide answers to these questions
from an incentive perspective.
A typical explanation for delegation in corporations is based on managers’ expertise and
the ensuing beneﬁts of specialization. Jensen and Murphy (1990, p. 251) put it aptly: “Man-
agers often have better information than shareholders and boards in identifying investment
opportunities and assessing the proﬁtability of potential projects; indeed, the expectation that
managers will make superior investment decisions explains why shareholders relinquish deci-
sion rights over their assets by purchasing common stocks.” Underlying this explanation is
the assumption that communicating managers’ information is costly, or that shareholders or
boards do not have necessary expertise to process the information for decision-making even
if communicating the information is costless.(2) For, otherwise, shareholders or boards will
be able to make decisions based on the information that managers have, which is the central
insight from the revelation principle.
We take Jensen and Murphy’s explanation as a starting point, but go a step further by
assuming that managers need to incur private costs to acquire and process information. The
incentive problem becomes relatively easier without such costs. Our basic model is thus em-
(1) Separation of ownership and control in this sense, although not universally the case, is most prevalent in
the Anglo-American system of corporate governance. See La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (1999).
(2) The beneﬁts of hierarchies facing the costs of communicating and processing information have been put
forward by Arrow (1974) and Williamson (1983) among many others.
1bedded in an environment where managers can, at some costs, acquire information necessary
for investment decisions, which cannot be used by shareholders in designing incentive contracts
for managers. Several authors have resorted to such contractual incompleteness either implic-
itly or explicitly to explain why a multi-tier hierarchy with delegation can be superior to a
centralized mechanism. In the context of general revelation mechanisms, Melumad, Mookher-
jee and Reichelstein (1995) show that the outcome of an optimal revelation mechanism can
be achieved using decentralized contracts and proper sequencing of the contracts. Thus their
main point is that, when various contracting costs such as those of communicating information
necessary for the revelation mechanism are taken into account, there may be beneﬁts to dele-
gation. Laﬀont and Martimort (1998) show that delegation can dominate centralized contracts
when the possibility of collusion down the hierarchy is combined with limits on communication.
The limits on communication, according to these authors, require the centralized contracts be
anonymous, and diﬀerent agents be treated symmetrically. This facilitates collusion. With
decentralization, such a problem disappears.
Our paper is similar in spirit to the above studies, but has more concrete objectives.
Speciﬁcally we describe what we believe is a realistic, but tractable model of a corporate
hierarchy, and show when and why putting managers at the center of the multi-tier hierarchy
can beneﬁt shareholders. The main point of this paper can be explained using a simple scenario.
Consider a ﬁrm that consists of three parties, whom we call the principal, the manager and the
worker. The ﬁrm has two investment projects, for which the principal provides necessary funds.
The manager can acquire private information at some costs, which can be used in choosing a
right project to undertake. The worker can exert eﬀort that can increase the likelihood that
the chosen project is successful. Neither the manager’s private information nor the worker’s
eﬀort can be used for contracting purpose. A centralized mechanism in this setup has the
principal oﬀering contracts to both agents. A hierarchical mechanism puts either the manager
or the worker at the center of the three-tier contracting relationships: the principal designs a
contract for the agent at the center, who, in turn, designs a contract for the other agent.
Our main point is that a hierarchical mechanism with proper delegation can dominate
centralized contracting. The intuition is as follows. When the manager’s private information
cannot be used for centralized contracting purpose, there is a limit on the types of contracts
the principal can oﬀer the manager and the worker. This constrains the principal’s ability in
inducing desired actions from both agents, which may result in eﬃciency losses. On the other
hand, in a hierarchical mechanism where the manager is at the center, the manager can design
the worker’s contract after learning his private information. While he cannot condition the
worker’s contract on the private information, he can signal the private information through the
contract oﬀered. This can alleviate the asymmetry of information between the manager and
the worker, thereby enabling the manager to design a contract that can provide work incentives
2at lower costs than the one designed by the principal.(3) However, it does not automatically
follow that such eﬃciency gains will ﬂow back to the principal. This is because the manager
needs to be compensated for in order to realize the eﬃciency gains. If the required rent to the
manager is too large, then delegation could even hurt the principal despite overall eﬃciency
gains. We identify factors that aﬀect the size of the manager’s rent and characterize conditions
under which the principal is better oﬀ by delegating to the manager. Our analysis also shows
why delegating to the worker cannot beneﬁt the principal, since the worker is in no better
position than the principal when oﬀering contracts to the manager.
Other studies on delegation in a hierarchy include, among others, Baron and Besanko
(1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), McAfee and McMillan (1995), Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om
(1998), Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-Castrillo (1998), Mookherjee and Reichelstein (2001), and
Faure-Grimaud, Laﬀont and Martimort (2003). Baron and Besanko (1992), and Gilbert and
Riordan (1995) establish equivalence between centralized and decentralized mechanisms when
risk-neutral agents provide complementary inputs to production. McAfee and McMillan (1995)
consider a three-tier hierarchy subject to limited liability constraints, showing losses involved in
a three-tier hierarchy relative to centralized contracting. Equivalence of a decentralized mech-
anism and a centralized mechanism subject to the possibility of side-contracting is established
in a moral hazard environment by Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998), and Macho-Stadler and P´ erez-
Castrillo (1998), in an environment with additional coordination problems by Mookherjee and
Reichelstein (2001), and in a principal-supervisor-agent setup by Faure-Grimaud, Laﬀont and
Martimort (2003). An additional conclusion of Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998) relates to the pat-
tern of delegation: the agent with superior information is more likely to be delegated. While
not directly concerned with delegation, Itoh (1992, 1993) studies a multiple-agent moral haz-
ard environment to show when the principal can beneﬁt by allowing coalition of agents, when
agents can monitor each other. With the equivalence result described above, his ﬁndings can
be regarded as supportive of delegation over centralization when agents have informational
advantages over the principal.
Our work diﬀers from, but complements these and afore-mentioned studies on hierarchy
at least in two important ways. In our model, the manager, or the intermediate agent, is not
endowed with private information. Rather, he needs to incur private costs to acquire informa-
tion. Because of this information acquisition, there are beneﬁts from delegating authority to
the manager to represent shareholders in dealing with other stakeholders. In the above studies
on hierarchy, there is no a priori reason why a particular agent should be at the center of the
(3) In a similar vein but in a costly veriﬁcation environment, Choe (1998) shows that the contract designed
by the informed party can reduce the veriﬁcation cost compared to the one designed by the uninformed party.
The reason is that the informed party, in an attempt to maximize the value of his residual claim, designs the
contract to give himself truth-telling incentives.
3multi-tier hierarchy.(4) It could be any of the agents supplying inputs. In our model, beneﬁ-
cial delegation occurs only when the manager, not the worker, assumes the role. Second and
related, the managerial input and the worker’s input are quite distinct. We believe that the
manager’s information acquisition and subsequent decision making are what distinguish man-
agerial inputs from those of other employees in corporations. Roughly speaking, the manager’s
decision making can be identiﬁed with the choice of a particular distribution of proﬁts, while
other employees’ inputs aﬀect the likelihood of proﬁt realization given the chosen distribution.
It is in this sense that one of the manager’s roles can be described as that of direction setting.
We thus expect optimal incentive schemes for the manager to be quite diﬀerent from those for
other employees. Indeed we show that the manager, when delegated authority, can actively
aﬀect his own payoﬀ through the choice of project and the design of contract for the worker.
Thus incentives and authority are strongly complementary for the party who is delegated au-
thority. For the worker, the scope of such inﬂuence upon his own payoﬀ is less signiﬁcant, as
is the case for employees lower in the corporate hierarchy: the worker in our paper is paid an
eﬃciency wage under manager delegation.(5)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section
3 studies the centralized mechanism. Section 4 analyzes the case of manager delegation, which
is then compared with centralization in Section 5. Section 6 discusses other relevant issues
that are left out: worker delegation and the possibility of using additional information for
mechanism design. Section 7 concludes the paper. The appendix contains the proofs of the
results that are not central to the exposition of our main ideas.
2. The Model
There are three parties, whom we call the principal, the manager and the worker.(6) The
principal has two projects, denoted by  1 and  2, whose return has the same support: x > 0
(success) or 0 (failure). The return is publicly observable and can be used for contracting
purpose.(7) The manager can privately observe a signal  2 f1;2g at a monetary cost of
c > 0, which we will call information gathering. We can also think of a signal as a perfect
predictor of a ‘state’. It is common knowledge that 1 will be observed with probability
(4) As mentioned above, Baliga and Sj¨ ostr¨ om (1998) is a notable exception.
(5) One could take this as an incentives-based explanation of why stock options have been the single most
important incentive for CEOs in Anglo-American corporations (Murphy, 1999). While the use of stock options
for non-executive employees was also growing in the late 1990s (Core and Guay, 2001), the proportion of
incentives provided through stock options is eclipsed compared to that for CEOs (Economist, 2003, p. 9.).
(6) We will use the female gender pronoun for the principal and the male gender pronoun for the manager
and the worker.
(7) If the return has a diﬀerent support, then contracts can be written eﬀectively on the identity of project
as well. We rule out this possibility for most part of the paper. In Section 6.2, we discuss the case where
project choice can be contracted upon.
4 2 (0;1). The manager’s decision of information gathering is denoted by dm 2 f0;1g. If
dm = 0, then the manager observes nothing and we denote this null signal by ;, and the
set of all possible signals by Θ = f1;2;;g: The worker privately chooses “work” or “shirk”,
respectively denoted by dw = 1 and dw = 0. The monetary cost of work is ` and that of
shirk is normalized to 0. Given i, the success probability for  1 ( 2, respectively) is pi (qi,
respectively) if dw = 1.(8) If dw = 0, then the success probability is r for either project and
state.(9) We assume that all the players are risk neutral, limited liability sets a lower bound of
0 for payments to the manager and the worker, and that reservation utilities for both agents
are zero.
The principal wishes to hire the manager to use his information for project choice, and
the worker to exert eﬀort for the chosen project. As the manager is the only player who can
contribute to project choice through his private information, we will assume that, once hired,
the manager is delegated the project choice decision. The manager’s project choice decision
is denoted by a mapping C : f1;2g ! f 1; 2g if dm = 1 and by C(;) 2 f1;2g if dm = 0.
One can also imagine a message game where the principal asks the manager to report his
signal, based on which she makes a project choice decision. For this revelation game to be
meaningful, the principal needs to commit to a rule that details how the manager’s report will
be used for project choice, which is known to the manager. Since the principal does not have
an opportunity to gather information herself, real authority of project choice resides with the
manager while the principal’s role is reduced to that of rubber-stamping. It is thus without loss
of generality to assume that the manager has both formal and real authority of project choice
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Moreover, we rule out the possibility of such message games in line
with the Grossman-Hart-Moore models (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990))
and focus on the case where the project return is the only variable available for contracting
purpose.
Deﬁne ∆pi  pi  r; ∆qi  qi  r; i = 1;2. These are improvements in success
probabilities due to the worker’s contribution. We maintain the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: p1 + (1  )p2 > q1 + (1  )q2.
Assumption 2: p1 > p2 > r,(10) q2 > q1 > r; ∆p1 > `
x > ∆q2:
Assumption 3: (1  )(q2  p2) > c
x.
Assumption 4: [∆p1 + (1  )∆p2]x > `.
Assumption 1 states that  1 is better than  2 given the prior belief. To understand
the implications of the remaining assumptions, consider the following project choice decision:
(8) Projects are identiﬁed with p and q and, states, with the subscripts.
(9) Our main qualitative results are robust to diﬀerent success probabilities depending on the state and
project when dw = 0, as long as they are suﬃciently small relative to pi and qi.
(10) p1 > p2 is implied by the rest of Assumption 2 and Assumption 3, but we listed it for completeness.
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and that the worker’s contribution is valuable only in  1 given this decision.(11) Assumption
3 says that the above project choice decision leads to a larger expected return than when  1
is chosen all the time, given that the worker’s action is the same in both cases. Assumptions
1 and 3 jointly lead to (p1  q1) > c
x. That is, the expected return from the above project
choice decision is also larger than that from always choosing  2, given the same action by the
worker. Finally, Assumption 4 states that the expected return (less the worker’s cost of work)
from always choosing  1 and engaging the worker is larger than that from not engaging either
agent at all, the latter being rx. This assumption is intended to make the trivial option of
engaging neither agent a less likely outcome to be chosen by the principal. These assumptions
lead to
LEMMA 1: If the principal can observe both the manager’s signal and the worker’s action,
and enforce desired actions, then the resulting ﬁrst-best outcome involves the following: the
manager gathers information (dm = 1) and chooses project i if and only if i is observed
(C(i) =  i for i = 1;2), and the worker exerts eﬀort only in state 1 (dw = 1 only in 1).(12)
PROOF: See the appendix.
We will call the project choice decision in the ﬁrst-best outcome optimal. Assumptions 1 to
4 portray a natural but economical environment where a meaningful comparison of delegation
vis-` a-vis centralization can be made. That is, delegation to a proper agent (the manager,
as we are about to establish) can implement a larger set of outcomes than centralization,
including the ﬁrst-best one. It is because delegation can motivate the agent to acquire valuable
information and the revelation game is precluded. On the other hand, the delegated agent will
have to be given incentives to implement the outcome that the principal desires but cannot
implement under centralization. Providing such incentives may require leaving a larger rent to
the delegated agent than centralization. Delegation therefore entails both costs and beneﬁts to
the principal. The central aim of this paper is to investigate when such beneﬁts outweigh costs,
in which case meaningful delegation will emerge endogenously. Given that the principal has a
(11) If the worker’s input is always valuable, then the manager’s information is valuable only for project
choice, but not for incentive provision to the worker. In this case, the principal can provide separate incentives
to the manager and the worker, thereby implementing the desired outcome through centralization. Therefore
delegation and the accompanied interlocking incentives do not have much bite. If the worker’s optimal input
is state-dependent, however, then the manager’s information has additional value: it can be used for providing
eﬃcient work incentives to the worker. The latter part of the manager’s information can only be utilized under
delegation if the manager’s information cannot be used for contracting purpose.
(12) When dw = 0, project choice becomes irrelevant since success probability is the same in both projects
and states. The ﬁrst-best outcome, to be more precise, is thus: dm = 1, C(1) =  1, C(2) 2 f 1; 2g, dw = 1
only in 1. Since this outcome yields the same expected return as the outcome in Lemma 1, we focus on the
latter outcome only.
6ﬁnal say in the choice of mechanism, we could view such endogenous delegation as an incentive-
based explanation of transition from “personal capitalism” to “managerial capitalism”.
3. Centralization
Under centralization, the principal designs contracts for both agents. Because contracts are
based on the ﬁnal return only, and limited liability sets a lower bound for payments, centralized
contracts are a payment s  0 to the manager and w  0 to the worker if x is realized, and 0
otherwise. We will focus on the principal’s problem of implementing a desired outcome as a
Nash equilibrium of the game between the two agents. Since the principal does not have access
to the manager’s information, she cannot induce diﬀerent work decisions from the worker in
diﬀerent states: the worker is induced to work in both states or shirk in both states.(13) Note
also that the principal is never better oﬀ if the manager, after gathering information, makes a
project choice other than the optimal one. Moreover, the principal is (weakly) better oﬀ with
 1 than  2 if the manager does not gather information. The last two observations are due to
the assumptions we made above. Finally, if the worker chooses to shirk in both states, then
the manager’s information gathering and project choice do not have any value. Therefore,
there are essentially only three diﬀerent outcomes for the principal to consider.
LEMMA 2: In equilibrium under centralization, one of the following outcomes takes place:
(C1) The manager gathers information (dm = 1), makes an optimal project choice (C(i) =  i
for i = 1;2), and the worker chooses to work in both states (dw = 1 in 1 and 2);
(C2) The manager does not gather information (dm = 0), always chooses  1 (C(;) =  1), and
the worker chooses to work in both states (dw = 1 in 1 and 2);
(C3) The worker chooses to shirk in both states regardless of the manager’s decisions (dw = 0
in 1 and 2).
We solve below for optimal centralized contracts implementing each of the above outcomes.
3.1. Centralization implementing outcome (C1)
Let U(dm;dw) be the worker’s expected payoﬀ given (dm;dw). Note that, if dm = 1, then
the manager will always make the optimal project choice since his contract is monotonic in the
(13) This is because we rule out the possibility of side contracting between the two agents. If side contracting
is allowed, then the principal is able to implement diﬀerent work decisions from the worker, similar in spirit to
Itoh (1993) that allowing coalition of agents can beneﬁt the principal when agents have superior information.
Since such a collusive outcome under centralization can be replicated by proper decentralization, this brings us
back to the equivalence principle: centralization with the possibility of collusion and proper decentralization
lead to the same outcome.
7ﬁnal return. Given dm = 1 and the optimal project choice, the worker’s incentive compatibility
constraint is:(14)
U(1;1)  U(1;0) () [p1 + (1  )q2]w  `  [r + (1  )r]w
() w 
`
∆p1 + (1  )∆q2
:
(1)
Thus the optimal contract for the worker in this case is wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆q2.
Let V (dm;dw) be the manager’s expected payoﬀ given (dm;dw) and the optimal project
choice when dm = 1. That is, V (1;1) = [p1 + (1  )q2]s  c. When dm = 0, denote
Vi(0;dw) to be the manager’s expected payoﬀ when he always chooses  i, i = 1;2. That
is, V1(0;1) = [p1 + (1  )p2]s and V2(0;1) = [q1 + (1  )q2]s. The manager could
also randomize, but we can ignore this since randomization will be dominated by either of the
above two. Given dw = 1, then the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is:
V (1;1)  maxfV1(0;1);V2(0;1)g () s  max
(
c






Due to Assumption 1, (1)(q2p2) < (p1q1). Thus the optimal contract for the manager
is given by sC = c
(1)(q2p2). The expected payoﬀ for the principal is then




(1  )(q2  p2)

`
∆p1 + (1  )∆q2
!
: (3)
3.2. Centralization implementing outcome (C2)
In this case, the payment to the manager will be always 0 and we assume that the manager,
out of indiﬀerence, makes a project choice decision that is desired by the principal. If the
manager always chooses  1, then the incentive compatibility constraint for the worker to
choose dw = 1 is given by [p1 + (1  )p2]w  `  rw, or w  `
∆p1+(1)∆p2. If
the manager always chooses  2, then the incentive compatibility constraint for the worker is
[q1 + (1  )q2]w  `  rw, or w  `
∆q1+(1)∆q2. Due to Assumption 1, the optimal
contract for the worker in this case is wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆p2. The expected payoﬀ for the
principal is then




∆p1 + (1  )∆p2
!
: (4)
(14) Participation constraints are satisﬁed for both agents as long as incentive compatibility constraints are,
so we ignore participation constraints throughout.
83.3. Centralization implementing outcome (C3)
In this case, wC = sC = 0 and the expected payoﬀ for the principal is
ZC3 = rx: (5)
Combining these three cases, we have
PROPOSITION 1: The optimal contracts under centralization are one of the following:
(a) If ZC1  maxfZC2;ZC3g, then sC = c
(1)(q2p2) in case of success, 0 otherwise, and
wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆q2 in case of success, 0 otherwise, which implement outcome (C1);
(b) If ZC2  maxfZC1;ZC3g, then sC = 0, wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆p2 in case of success, 0
otherwise, which implement outcome (C2);
(c) If ZC3  maxfZC1;ZC2g, then sC = wC = 0, which implement outcome (C3).
4. Manager Delegation
The principal continues to design contracts for the manager, who is now delegated the authority
to design a contract for the worker. To distinguish notation from the previous section, we now
use  and ! to denote the payment to the manager and the worker, respectively, in case of
success. Therefore the manager’s net income in case of success is   !. Since the manager
has, or may have acquired, private information when oﬀering a contract to the worker, we
focus on a sequential equilibrium of the subcontracting game between the two agents. In the
sequential equilibrium of the subcontracting game, the manager designs ! given his information
gathering and project choice decisions. Given !, the worker forms a belief regarding the
manager’s information gathering (dm), project choice (  2 f 1; 2g), and the signal observed
( 2 f1;2;;g). Denote this belief by (dm; ;j!). Our focus is whether the principal can
beneﬁt from delegation. Intuitively a necessary condition for this is that the manager should
be able to use his private information to provide better work incentives to the worker: the
worker is induced to work at a minimal cost only when his work is valuable. In other words,
the ﬁrst-best outcome we looked at previously seems to be a candidate equilibrium outcome of
the subcontracting game that can potentially beneﬁt the principal compared to centralization.
Of course, such beneﬁts will not materialize if the principal has to pay too high a rent to the
manager to induce the ﬁrst-best outcome. In this section, we delineate when such beneﬁts
indeed materialize.
We start by identifying possible equilibria in the subcontracting game between the man-
ager and the worker. We can divide all possible outcomes into several cases. First, the manager
gathers information and makes an optimal project choice. Given this, there are four possibil-
ities: dw = 1 only in state 1, which is the ﬁrst-best outcome; dw = 1 in both states, which is
9the same as outcome (C1) under centralization; dw = 1 only in state 2; dw = 0 in both states.
Clearly the last outcome cannot be implemented since the manager will not have incentives to
work if dw = 0 in both states. The third outcome will be dominated by the ﬁrst one due to
Assumption 2. The only meaningful cases are thus the ﬁrst two: the ﬁrst-best outcome and
(C1). Next are the outcomes where the manager gathers information but makes a suboptimal
project choice. But each of the outcomes in this case will be dominated by the corresponding
outcome of the previous case where the project choice is an optimal one. Finally there are
outcomes where the manager does not gather information and hence cannot induce diﬀerent
work decisions from the worker in diﬀerent states. Here we only need to consider the case
where  1 is chosen always since  2 is dominated by  1. One possible outcome from this is
where the worker is induced to work in both states, which corresponds to outcome (C2) under
centralization. The other possibility is where the worker is induced to shirk in both states,
which is the same as outcome (C3) under centralization. Summarizing, we have
LEMMA 3: In equilibrium under manager delegation, one of the following takes place:
(MD1) The manager gathers information (dm = 1), makes an optimal project choice (C(i) =
 i for i = 1;2), and induces work from the worker only in state 1 (dw = 1 only in 1);
(MD2 = C1) The manager gathers information (dm = 1), makes an optimal project choice,
and induces work from the worker in both states (dw = 1 in 1;2);
(MD3 = C2) The manager does not gather information (dm = 0), chooses  1 (C(;) =  1),
and induces work from the worker in both states (dw = 1 in 1;2);
(MD4 = C3) The manager does not gather information, chooses either project and induces
shirk from the worker in both states (dw = 0 in 1;2).
We argued above that the principal may beneﬁt from manager delegation if (MD1) ensues.
In Section 4.1, we ﬁrst show that the principal is never better oﬀ with manager delegation when
delegation implements outcomes other than (MD1). This leads us to focus on outcome (MD1)
for the case of beneﬁcial delegation, which is discussed in Section 4.2.
4.1. Manager delegation implementing outcomes other than (MD1)
From Lemma 3, we know that outcomes other than (MD1) that can be implemented under
manager delegation are exactly those that are implementable under centralization. Intuition
tells us, then, that the principal may not be better oﬀ by delegating to the manager to imple-
ment the same outcome that she could implement under centralization. With centralization,
the principal directly controls both agents’ incentives. With delegation, the principal directly
controls only the manager’s incentives while the worker’s incentives are indirectly controlled
through the manager’s contract. This creates the problem of double incentivization akin to
10that of double marginalization, which could increase the total payment to the two agents com-
pared to centralization. Therefore, if the same outcome is implemented under both regimes
and so the total surplus remains the same, the principal would be generally worse oﬀ with
delegation.
PROPOSITION 2: The principal is never better oﬀ under manager delegation than under
centralization when delegation implements outcomes other than (MD1).
PROOF: See the appendix.
4.2. Manager delegation implementing (MD1)
The equilibrium leading to outcome (MD1) is described in more detail as follows: the
principal contracts with the manager paying   0 in case of success; the manager accepts
the contract and incurs c to gather information; if 1 is observed, he chooses  1 and oﬀers the
worker !1  0 in case of success, which the worker accepts and exerts eﬀort (i.e., dw(!1) = 1);
if 2 is observed, the manager chooses  2 and oﬀers the worker !2  0 in case of success, which
the worker accepts and does not exert eﬀort (i.e., dw(!2) = 0).(15)
Below we check the conditions for such a strategy proﬁle to indeed constitute an equi-
librium. First, note that !1 6= !2 so that the worker can respond diﬀerently to the two
equilibrium wage oﬀers. Since the manager can ensure inducing dw = 0 from the worker with
an arbitrarily low but nonnegative wage oﬀer, !2 = 0 in equilibrium. When !1 is oﬀered, the
worker infers correctly that the success probability is p1 if he works and r if not, hence he





Since the worker observes !1 but neither  nor the project choice by the manager, the
worker’s strategy is a function of wage oﬀer only. Given !1 satisfying (6), the worker’s equi-
librium strategy is thus dw(!) = 0 for all ! < !1, which is supported by the worker’s belief,
(dm = 1; 1;1 j !  !1) = (dm = 1; 2;2 j ! < !1) = 1.(16) The manager’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀ is then
V1 = p1(  !1) + (1  )r  c: (7)
To check the manager’s incentive compatibility, we now consider possible deviations by
the manager. Suppose ﬁrst the manager deviates by inducing diﬀerent work decisions from the
(15) If 2 is observed and dw = 0 is induced, it does not matter which project is chosen. We assume in this
case that the manager chooses  2.
(16) We focus on pure strategies of the worker only since the worker would accept any positive wage oﬀer
because nonnegative payoﬀ is guaranteed by shirking.
11worker, while adhering to the rest of the equilibrium strategy. That is, dm = 1 and C(i) =  i
for i = 1;2. First, the manager can implement dw = 1 in both states by oﬀering !1 in both
states. The resulting expected payoﬀ for the manager is
V2 = [p1 + (1  )q2](  !1)  c: (8)
Second, the manager can implement dw = 0 by oﬀering ! = 0 in both states, and securing
himself rc. However this will be worse for the manager than choosing dm = 0 and inducing
dw = 0, which leads to the expected payoﬀ of r. In other words, r is the minimum payoﬀ
the manager can secure himself. So we ignore this deviation. Third, the manager can induce
dw = 1 only in state 2 by oﬀering !1 only in state 2. The manager’s expected payoﬀ in this
case is
V3 = rs + (1  )q2(  !1)  c: (9)
Next we can consider the manager’s deviations, dm = 1 but C(i) =  j, i 6= j. Regardless
of subsequent wage oﬀers and dw, the manager will not beneﬁt from this compared to the
above cases. This is because of Assumptions 1 and 2, which imply that  1 dominates  2, and
that i is good news for project i. So we can ignore this case.
The remaining cases involve dm = 0. First, the manager can choose  1 and induce dw = 1
in both states by oﬀering !1 in both states. The expected payoﬀ in this case is
V4 = [p1 + (1  )p2](  !1): (10)
Second, the manager can choose  2 and induce dw = 1 in both states by oﬀering !1 in both
states. But this will be dominated by the above deviation due to Assumption 1.(17) Finally,
the manager can secure himself r by oﬀering ! = 0 in both states regardless of project choice.
The minimum expected payoﬀ the manager can secure himself is
V5 = r: (11)
For V1 to be the equilibrium expected payoﬀ for the manager, we need V1  Vk; for
k = 2;:::;5: Note that V1  V5 implies that p1( !1)c  r, hence V2  V3. Therefore,
V1  V3 is implied by V1  V2 and V1  V5, so the manager’s incentive compatibility is satisﬁed
if and only if the following inequalities hold:




(17) When dm = 0, the manager cannot oﬀer separating contracts. The manager can also randomize, but
this will be dominated by either of the two pure strategies.














Summarizing the discussions so far, we can conclude that the principal can implement
(MD1) if the set of (;!1) satisfying (6), (12), (13) and (14) is not empty. In that case, the
principal can maximize her expected payoﬀ by oﬀering  =
p1
∆p1!1+ c
∆p1 to the manager. The
following proposition describes the optimal contracts under manager delegation that implement
(MD1).
PROPOSITION 3: The principal can implement outcome (MD1) under manager delegation by
oﬀering the manager  =
p1
∆p1!1+ c
∆p1 in case of success, where !1 is the optimal subcontract
that the manager oﬀers to the worker in case of success when  = 1, as speciﬁed below:
(a) If  >
q2p2
p1p2 and ` <
c∆p1[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r  `1(), then !1 =
c[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r ;
(b) If  >
q2p2
p1p2 and ` 
c∆p1[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r  `1(), then !1 = `
∆p1;
(c) If  
q2p2
p1p2 and ` <
c∆p1∆q2
(p1q2)r  `2(), then !1 =
c∆q2
(p1q2)r;
(d) If  
q2p2
p1p2 and ` 
c∆p1∆q2
(p1q2)r  `2(), then !1 = `
∆p1.
PROOF: See the appendix.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 3, let us denote !  `
∆p1, !12 
c∆q2
(p1q2)r, and !13 
c[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r . Note that ! is the minimum wage that satisﬁes
the worker’s incentive constraint (6), and !  minf!12;!13g for each of the corresponding
cases. Since the manager has residual claim in the subcontracting stage with the worker, the
principal is more likely to beneﬁt from manager delegation and (MD1) if !1 = !. Figure 1
describes the optimal subcontract for the worker. It is easy to verify that  
q2p2
p1p2 if and
only if `1()  `2(). As shown in the ﬁgure, the optimal subcontract for the worker is ! in
either of the following two situations. First, if ` is large enough, then a wide range of  admits
! as an optimal contract for the worker. Suppose, for example, that  is suﬃciently large
or small, which implies that the manager’s information does not have much value. For large
, the principal could be better oﬀ by asking the manager to choose  1 without information
gathering, thus implementing (C2) under centralization. Similarly, for suﬃciently small ,
the principal could be better oﬀ with outcome (C3). Thus, for the principal to beneﬁt from
manager delegation when the manager’s information is not valuable enough, ` should be large
enough, which can be saved with manager delegation when 2 is observed. Second,  is in the
intermediate range if ` is not large enough. That  is in the intermediate range implies that
the manager’s information and the optimal project choice are suﬃciently valuable. Therefore,
if ` is not large enough, then the manager’s information has to be valuable enough for the
principal to beneﬁt from manager delegation.
13— Figure 1 goes about here. —
In the next section, we compare centralization with manager delegation when delegation
implements (MD1) and the equilibrium subcontract for the worker is !. The principal’s
expected payoﬀ from manager delegation is then










5. Comparing Centralization with Manager Delegation
Let us summarize what we have obtained so far. There are three possible equilibrium outcomes
under centralization, (C1), (C2) and (C3), each leading to the principal’s expected payoﬀ
given by (3), (4) and (5). Due to Proposition 2, we know that the only possible way manager
delegation can dominate any of the above is when delegation implements (MD1), which leads
to the principal’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ given by (15) if the optimal contract for the
worker is !. We start with a numerical example.
We set parameter values: p1 = 0:9; p2 = 0:3; q1 = 0:4; q2 = 0:45;  = 0:63; r = 0:25; ` =
4; c = 0:1; x = 20. These values satisfy Assumptions 1 to 4 and the conditions under which !
is the optimal contract for the worker under manager delegation. The principal’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀs are then ZC1 = 7:28; ZC2 = 7:22; ZC3 = 5; ZD = 7:41, verifying that the
principal is better oﬀ under manager delegation when outcome (MD1) is implemented. To
see how manager delegation performs relative to centralization, we plot how the principal’s
expected payoﬀs change as c; ` and  change. Figure 2.1 shows how the principal’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀs change when c changes from 0.01 to 0.39. As c increases, ZC1;ZC2 and ZD
all decrease, but ZC2 decreases at the smallest rate, with the optimal outcome changing from
(C1) to (MD1), and then to (C2). In Figure 2.2, the principal’s equilibrium expected payoﬀs
are plotted against ` as ` changes from 4 to 7.8.(18) As ` increases, all of them decrease but
ZD decreases at the smallest rate, making (MD1) dominate (C1) and (C2) until eventually
(C3) becomes optimal. Finally, Figure 2.3 shows how the principal’s equilibrium expected
payoﬀs change as  changes from 0.3 to 0.68. As explained before, small or large  implies
that the manager’s information does not have much value. This is shown in the ﬁgure: (MD1)
is initially dominated by (C3) (up to  = 0:31), becomes optimal for intermediate values of ,
but eventually dominated by (C2) as  becomes larger (for  larger than 0.65). This exercise
seems to suggest the following as necessary conditions for beneﬁcial manager delegation. First,
neither the manager’s cost of information gathering nor the worker’s cost of work should be
(18) We set c = 0:08 so that ZC1 is larger than ZD at the start.
14extreme. Second, the manager’s information should be reasonably valuable. In what follows,
we will formally compare centralization with manager delegation, identify factors that favor
manager delegation over centralization, and provide interpretations. In doing so, our discussion
will be focused on comparing (C1) and (MD1) since other outcomes, namely (C2) and (C3),
do not involve active inputs from one or both of the agents.
— Figure 2 goes about here. —
From the above example, we know that there exist suitable parameter values for which
manager delegation with (MD1) dominates any other outcomes under centralization. Let
RC1, UC1, and VC1 denote, respectively, the gross expected return (net of the manager’s and
the worker’s costs), the worker’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ, and the manager’s equilibrium
expected payoﬀ under centralization and outcome (C1). Similarly, let RD, UD and VD denote
those under manager delegation and (MD1). Then the principal’s equilibrium expected payoﬀs
are ZC1 = RC1  UC1  VC1 and ZD = RD  UD  VD, hence ZD  ZC1 = (RD  RC1) 
(UD  UC1)  (VD  VC1). Decomposing the change in the principal’s expected payoﬀs this
way helps us identify the costs and beneﬁts of delegation.
Note ﬁrst that RC1  [p1 +(1)q2]x(c+`) and RD  [p1 +(1)r]x(c+`):
Due to Assumption 2, we have RD  RC1 = (1  )(`  ∆q2x) > 0. This is one source of
possible beneﬁts from delegation. That is, delegation can lead to a larger expected return
by inducing an optimal eﬀort decision from the worker. Next let us compare the worker’s
equilibrium expected payoﬀs: UD = (p1!  `) = r`
∆p1 and UC1 = [p1 + (1  )q2]wC  ` =
r`
∆p1+(1)∆q2 where we have used ! = `
∆p1 and wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆q2: Since ∆p1 > ∆q2, it
follows that UC1 > UD. This is another source of possible beneﬁts from delegation. Under
centralization, the worker exerts eﬀort in both projects even when putting in eﬀort in  2 is
suboptimal. Because of limited liability and the principal’s inability to oﬀer state-dependent
contracts, suboptimal eﬀort in  2 is not penalized and the worker enjoys a rent larger than
is necessary. Since manager delegation can eliminate this ineﬃciency, the worker would be
strictly worse oﬀ under manager delegation. On the other hand, the manager may or may
not be better oﬀ under delegation. Comparing the manager’s equilibrium expected payoﬀs,





(∆p1)2. The ﬁrst term is the change in the manager’s payoﬀ from  1: the manager
receives   ! under delegation and sC under centralization. The second term is that from
 2: the manager does not need to pay ! to the worker and receives  under delegation
instead of sC. However, the probability of receiving  is lower since the worker is induced
not to exert eﬀort in  2. One cannot say unambiguously if either of these two terms is positive
or negative. Therefore, the change in the manager’s expected payoﬀ could be either another
source of beneﬁts from delegation, or its costs. Needless to say, delegation would increase
15the principal’s expected payoﬀ if and only if (RD  RC1) + (UC1  UD)  VD  VC1:(19) The
following proposition shows how the equilibrium expected payoﬀs for the manager and the
worker change from centralization to delegation.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose centralization implements (C1) and manager delegation imple-
ments (MD1) with ! as the equilibrium contract for the worker. Then,
(a) UD < UC1;
(b) If  >
q2p2
p1p2 and `  `1(), then there exists ˆ `() > `1() such that VD  VC1 if and only
if `  ˆ `() where `1() is as deﬁned in Proposition 3;
(c) If  
q2p2
p1p2 and `  `2(), then VD  VC1 where `2() is as deﬁned in Proposition 3.
PROOF: See the appendix.
The worker is strictly worse oﬀ under manager delegation for reasons explained earlier.
Then, should the manager be always better oﬀ when delegated authority? The above propo-
sition says it is not necessarily the case. In particular, if  >
q2p2
p1p2 and `1()  ` < ˆ `(),
then the manager is worse oﬀ with delegation. From the proof of Proposition 4, one can show
that ˆ `() is increasing in , ˆ `()  `1() if  
q2p2
p1p2, and ˆ `()  `2() if  
q2p2
p1p2. Since
`1() = `2() if  =
q2p2
p1p2, we must have ˆ `() = `1() = `2() for the same value of . Based
on this, Figure 3 describes the set of (;`) for which delegation makes the manager worse oﬀ,
the area labeled as VD  VC1.
— Figure 3 goes about here. —
To see why delegation could make the manager worse oﬀ, suppose  =
q2p2
p1p2. Then, from
Proposition 3, the minimum value of ` that supports the worker’s optimal wage at its minimum
incentive-compatible level (i.e., !) is where ˆ `(), `1() and `2() all intersect, as shown in
Figure 3. Given such (;`), we know VD = VC1 from Proposition 4. Consider now changes
in (;`) while keeping ! as the optimal wage for the worker. Suppose that  increases.
This is bad news for the manager in (MD1) since larger  implies more frequent payment
of !, which is independent of . This can be conﬁrmed by straightforward calculation:
@VD
@ =  cr
2∆p1 < 0. However, an increase in  beneﬁts the manager in (C1) since larger 
(19) In an environment of team production with mutual monitoring, Itoh (1993) identiﬁes conditions under
which allowing side contracting between agents can strictly improve the principal’s welfare compared to when
side contracting is not allowed. Since the outcome from a centralized mechanism with side contracting can be
replicated by suitable delegation (i.e., the equivalence result mentioned earlier in the paper), his ﬁndings can
be recast in our setting. One of Itoh’s conditions is that the agents’ preferences are restricted so that their
participation constraints are binding in equilibrium. Therefore, the beneﬁts from better eﬀort coordination
through mutual monitoring (when side contracting is allowed) come at no additional cost. This would mean,
in our setting, that only the ﬁrst source of beneﬁts from delegation remains and the next two terms will vanish,
increasing the principal’s welfare unambiguously. In our model, however, participation constraints are not
binding because of limited liability.
16implies more chance of success: @VC1
@ =
cp1
(1)2(q2p2) > 0. On the other hand, an increase
in  needs to be accompanied by an increase in ` to keep ! as the optimal wage for the
worker. In (MD1), an increase in ` beneﬁts the manager since the principal can compensate
the worker for the increase only indirectly by increasing the gross payment to the manager.
Under centralization, the worker’s and the manager’s incentives are separated and, therefore,
the manager’s expected payoﬀ does not depend on `. Since the manager controls the worker’s
incentives under manager delegation, an increase in ` leads to not only an increase in the
worker’s payoﬀ but also an increase in the manager’s payoﬀ. This is the problem of double
incentivization. It is easy to verify that @VD
@` =
p1r
(∆p1)2 > 0. Putting all these together, we can
conclude that, when  increases from
q2p2
p1p2, the manager will be worse oﬀ in (MD1) if the
corresponding increase in ` is not large enough.(20)
An alternative explanation of the above can be oﬀered by re-interpreting the beneﬁts of
delegated contracting authority to the manager. The manager beneﬁts from delegated con-
tracting authority through its option value: when 2 is observed, the manager can realize
the full value of his residual claim by inducing an eﬃcient eﬀort level (dw = 0) from the
worker. The value of his residual claim is smaller if ` is smaller since, as ` becomes smaller,
the principal’s gross payment to the manager becomes smaller. At the same time, the option
value of delegated contracting authority decreases as  increases. Therefore, delegation can
make the manager worse oﬀ relative to centralized contracting if the option value of delegated
contracting authority is smaller. In this case, the principal would prefer delegation to central-
ization. But this is only one suﬃcient case for beneﬁcial delegation. If the ﬁrst two beneﬁts
of delegation previously discussed are large enough, then manager delegation could beneﬁt
both the principal and the manager. To understand better when manager delegation is likely
to dominate centralization, we now move onto direct comparison of the principal’s expected
payoﬀs in response to changes in c, ` and .
Consider ﬁrst changes in ` and . We consider simultaneous changes in ` and  since,
as discussed in Proposition 4, changes in both may be necessary to support ! as the optimal
contract for the worker in (MD1). Suppose ` increases. Then the principal’s expected payoﬀ
in (C1) decreases primarily due to a decrease in the gross expected return ( @RC1
@` = 1), and
an increase in the worker’s expected payoﬀ ( @UC1
@` = r
∆p1+(1)∆q2). As explained before, the
manager’s incentives do not depend on ` under centralization and, therefore, changes in ` do
not aﬀect the manager’s expected payoﬀ in (C1). On the other hand, the principal’s expected
payoﬀ in (MD1) decreases in ` because of the above two factors as well as an increase in the
manager’s expected payoﬀ. As shown above, @VD
@` =
p1r
(∆p1)2 > 0. Suppose now  increases at
the same time as ` increases. In (C1), this aﬀects only the change in the worker’s expected
(20) In the other case where  decreases from
q2p2
p1p2 while ` increases to support !, the manager is better
oﬀ unambiguously in (MD1) since both changes in  and ` beneﬁt the manager in (MD1).






< 0. Therefore, the rate of decrease in ZC1 with respect to ` becomes smaller when
 increases. In (MD1), however, a simultaneous increase in  escalates the decrease in ZD.





= 1. This is because, in (MD1),
the worker exerts eﬀort only in  1, which is chosen more often as  increases. Second, larger





> 0. Unlike in (C1), the worker beneﬁts in
(MD1) when  1 is chosen, which is more likely, the larger  becomes. To summarize, when 
increases, the rate of decrease in ZD with respect to ` becomes larger. Based on this, we can
establish the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: There exists ˜  2 [0;1) such that @ZC1
@`  @ZD
@` for all   ˜ . Moreover, if
r is small in the sense that p1∆q2r(∆p1)2q2 < 0, then ˜  is strictly positive and @ZC1
@` < @ZD
@`
for all  < ˜ .
PROOF: See the appendix.
The above proposition implies that (MD1) is more likely to dominate (C1) as ` becomes
smaller (larger, respectively) if  is large (small, respectively). To understand why, let us
note that we can measure the value of the manager’s information as the diﬀerence between the
gross expected return in (MD1) and that from the next best alternative without the manager’s
information. In manager delegation, the latter is given by [p1+(1)p2]x`, which follows
from Assumptions 1, 2 and 4. Thus the value of the manager’s information is (1  )(` 
∆p2x)c. The manager’s information is more valuable, the smaller  is, or the larger ` is.(21)
This is because the manager’s information can be used to correct ineﬃciency in centralization,
which is due to suboptimal eﬀort incentives for the worker when  2 is chosen. Ineﬃciency from
suboptimal eﬀort incentives (i.e., the worker’s moral hazard problem) becomes more serious if
` is larger. The incidence of such ineﬃciency is more likely if  is smaller. While the worker’s
moral hazard problem and corresponding ineﬃciency could be solved through delegation and,
therefore, larger ` implies larger eﬃciency gains from delegation, it also implies larger costs of
double incentivization in delegation. Thus the choice between delegation and centralization
depends primarily on two kinds of considerations: eﬃciency gains and the costs of double
incentivization. This is the main implication of Proposition 5. The ﬁrst part of the proposition
says that, if  is large, then centralization is more likely to dominate delegation when ` is
larger. That is, if the manager’s information is less valuable, then centralization is more likely
to dominate delegation when the worker’s moral hazard problem becomes more serious. The
costs of double incentivization in this case are more likely to outweigh the beneﬁts of eﬃciency
(21) Obviously, neither  nor ` can take extreme values since, then, (MD1) will be dominated by (C2) or (C3).
Our discussion is therefore conﬁned to the range of parameter values where (MD1) is optimal under manager
delegation.
18gains if the manager’s information is less valuable. By a similar reasoning, if the manager’s
information is more valuable, then delegation is more likely to dominate centralization when
the worker’s moral hazard problem becomes more serious. The eﬃciency beneﬁts of delegation
then could be large despite corresponding increases in the costs of double incentivization.
Next let us now look at changes in c. As c increases, the manager’s information gathering
cost increases, and so does the cost of motivating the manager. The latter cost is larger in
(C1) than in (MD1) as the rise in c is partly compensated for by the optimal incentives given
to the worker in (MD1). Since the manager has residual claim in the subcontracting stage, the
optimal work incentives to the worker in (MD1) imply that the manager does not need to be






∆p1. Note also that an increase in c decreases the gross expected return by the same amount
in (C1) and (MD1): @RC1
@c = @RD
@c = 1. Finally the worker’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ does
not depend on c in (C1) nor in (MD1). In sum, we have @ZC1
@c < @ZD
@c < 0. Therefore, as c
increases, we would expect the principal to prefer (MD1) to (C1) if she was initially indiﬀerent
between the two. Moreover, if (C1) is optimal under centralization and ZD = ZC1 initially,
then (MD1) is optimal under manager delegation, which follows from Proposition 2. Finally,
the range of c in which (C1) is optimal under centralization is a convex set since ZC1 decreases
linearly in c while ZC2 and ZC3 are independent of c. Summarizing, we have
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose (C1) is optimal under centralization for all c 2 [c;¯ c], and ZD =
ZC1 for some ˜ c 2 [c;¯ c]. Then, for all c 2 [˜ c;¯ c], (MD1) is optimal under manager delegation
and ZD  ZC1.
The main implication of Proposition 6 is that manager delegation is more likely to beneﬁt
the principal if the manager’s information gathering cost becomes larger.(22) One could think of
this cost as a proxy for the degree of managerial moral hazard. As c increases, it becomes more
costly to motivate the manager to gather information and make the right investment decision.
Compared to centralization, delegation can reduce this cost by making the manager a residual
claimant in the subcontracting stage. The manager can increase the value of his residual claim
by inducing the eﬃcient eﬀort level from the worker, of which the prerequisite is information
gathering and the optimal investment decision. It is in this sense that the delegated decision-
making authority and the delegated contracting authority are complementary with each other.
6. Further Discussions
6.1. Worker delegation
(22) Again c cannot be too large since, if it were, (C2) or (C3) will eventually dominate (MD1).
19The analyses of the previous sections indicate that manager delegation can beneﬁt the
principal only when delegation implements the outcome that the principal could not imple-
ment under centralization. The corollary is then that the principal would never beneﬁt from
delegating authority to the worker. The reason is that the principal and the worker share
the same prior information as regards the realization of states, nor do they have access to the
manager’s information. Therefore worker delegation can at best implement the same outcome
as that under centralization. Moreover, the worker, if delegated the authority to contract
with the manager, could have incentives not to induce the manager’s action that the principal
desires. Controlling such incentives could impose further costs on the principal. Therefore we
can conclude
PROPOSITION 7: The principal is never better oﬀ under worker delegation than under
centralization.
PROOF: See the appendix.
6.2. The case of veriﬁable project choice
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the return from the project is the only
variable upon which contracts can be written. This assumption was motivated on two grounds.
First, if the project choice can be also used for contracting purpose, then the principal is
weakly better oﬀ under centralization than any forms of delegation. This is because of the
binary nature of our model where the revelation principle applies: the principal can design the
manager’s contract in such a way that the manager truthfully reveals his private information
through project choice. In such an environment, it is well known that a centralized mechanism
where agents cannot side-contract is weakly preferred by the principal to any other mechanisms,
and a centralized mechanism where agents can side-contract can be replicated by suitable
delegation. To account for the prevalence of delegation, we are thus led to an environment
where centralized contracts can only be incomplete or there are additional costs of centralized
contracting. Second, due possibly to the complex nature of managerial decision-making, one
rarely observes in reality project-dependent compensation contracts for top management.
In this paper we have introduced contractual incompleteness through nonveriﬁability of
project choice. As alluded to in the previous paragraph, removing such incompleteness will lead
to the dominance of centralization over any other mechanisms, including diﬀerent forms of del-
egation. The intuition is straightforward. If the project choice is veriﬁable, then the principal
can implement outcomes that were not possible to implement previously under centralization.
In particular, the principal can implement the ﬁrst-best outcome by using project-dependent
contracts. Compared to centralization, manager delegation does not provide additional signal-
ing beneﬁts since centralized contracts can also elicit the manager’s private information, based
20on which eﬃcient incentives can be provided to the worker. Consequently, the principal can
implement the desired outcome with centralization without having to delegate, which could
otherwise require leaving a larger rent to the delegated agent than under centralization.
PROPOSITION 8: If the project choice can be used for contracting purpose, then the principal
is weakly better oﬀ under centralization than under delegation.
PROOF: See the appendix.
7. Conclusion
In a model with a principal and two agents, this paper has shown when delegation to a suit-
able agent can improve the principal’s welfare compared to centralized contracting. Identifying
delegation with conferral of the authority to make investment decisions and design contracts
for the other agent in the hierarchy, we have found conditions for beneﬁcial delegation. First,
a necessary condition for beneﬁcial delegation is intrinsic incompleteness in centralized con-
tracting when agents’ private information cannot be used for contracting purpose. Second,
beneﬁcial delegation obtains only when the agent who has access to private information is
delegated both types of authority. Third, the delegated agent should be motivated to gather
information, use it for eﬃcient decision-making and for the provision of better incentives to
the other agent. These are the beneﬁts of delegation, which stem mainly from eﬃciency gains.
The potential costs of delegation are that it may be necessary to reward the delegated agent
more than is necessary compared to centralized contracting, which we dubbed the costs of
double incentivization. The costs of delegation are therefore mainly distributional. Beneﬁcial
delegation obtains when the beneﬁts exceed the costs, which is more likely if the managerial
moral hazard problem is more serious, the worker’s moral hazard problem is less serious when
the manager’s information is less valuable, and the worker’s moral hazard problem is more
serious when the manager’s information is more valuable.
In our paper, delegation has both eﬃciency and distributional consequences. Beneﬁcial
delegation, while necessarily correcting ineﬃciency in centralized contracting, changes the
distribution of rent among all the involved parties. As a result, the agent at the bottom end
of the hierarchy is strictly worse oﬀ as the hierarchy becomes deeper. Although the delegated
agent may or may not be better oﬀ, we have identiﬁed a situation when the delegated agent is
worse oﬀ as well. In this case, the principal would beneﬁt from delegation through eﬃciency
gains as well as distributional changes. It is thus conceivable that beneﬁcial delegation may
be possible even in the absence of eﬃciency gains. Exploring into such a possibility will be an
extension of the current work.
While delegation in this paper combines the authority to make decisions and the authority
to contract with other agents, our analysis also suggests some interesting implications regarding
21internal organization of a ﬁrm when these two types of authority are decoupled. Consider an
organization where diﬀerent agents have, or need to acquire and process, suﬃciently distinct
and valuable information, and the cost of communicating the information is high. For example,
organizations with high human-capital intensity (such as computer industry ﬁrms in Silicon
Valley) would ﬁt this description. Delegated decision-making authority would be valuable
in this case. However, delegated contracting is unlikely to lead to more eﬃcient incentive
provision compared to centralization. The problem of double incentivization could loom large
relative to the beneﬁts of delegated contracting. Should this be the case, we would expect an
organization with ﬂatter hierarchies and decentralized decision making.(23)
An additional conclusion from this paper is that the delegated agent has more inﬂuence
upon his own compensation than the other agent does, since the delegated agent assumes
residual claim in the subcontracting stage. This, combined with the decision-making authority,
can be viewed as a reasonable portrayal of a corporate hierarchy where top managers, not other
stakeholders, are delegated authority, whose key role is that of direction-setting, and who are
often motivated through stocks and stock options. An extension of the current model that
can more fruitfully elucidate the nature of incentive pay in a hierarchy seems to be an exciting
avenue for future research.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Any implementable outcome can be denoted by a triple, (dm;C;dw).
We can divide all possible outcomes to two groups: dm = 1 and dm = 0. If dm = 1 in the
ﬁrst-best outcome, then we should necessarily have C(i) =  i; i = 1;2 regardless of dw. This
follows from Assumptions 1 to 3. Moreover, Assumption 2 implies that the worker’s input is
valuable only in  1. The ﬁrst-best outcome, if involving the manager’s input, should thus be:
dm = 1, C(i) =  i for i = 1;2, and dw = 1 only in 1. The gross expected return (net of the
manager’s and the worker’s costs) from this outcome is R1  [p1 + (1  )r]x  (c + `).
In case dm = 0 in the ﬁrst-best outcome, we should necessarily have C(;) =  1 regardless
of dw. This is because of Assumption 1. Therefore we are left with two possibilities: dw = 1 or
dw = 0. If dw = 1, then the gross expected return is R2  [p1+(1)p2]x`. If dw = 0, then
the gross expected return is rx, which is smaller than R2 because of Assumption 4. To prove
our claim, it is therefore suﬃcient to show R1  R2. But R1R2 = (1)(`∆p2x)c > 0
since ∆p2 < `
x  c
(1)x due to Assumptions 2 and 3.
(23) Depending on the extent to which organizational rents are expropriable, Rajan and Zingales (2001)
provide an explanation as to why ﬁrms in human-capital intensive industries will have ﬂatter hierarchies
compared to those in physical-capital intensive industries. Indeed Rajan and Wulf (2003) report evidence in
support of this: the intensity of physical capital as measured by the real value of ﬁxed assets per employee is
positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the depth of hierarchy in an organization.
22PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: Consider the case where delegation implements (MD2 =
C1). Let us start with the subcontracting game between the manager and the worker. Let
!(i)  0 denote the equilibrium wage for the worker in case of success. Given dm = 1 and
C(i) =  i, the minimum value of !(i) that induces dw = 1 in both states is !(1) = !(2) =
`
∆p1+(1)∆q2. Note that this is the same equilibrium wage that the principal would oﬀer
under centralization and (C1). For consistency, let us denote this by wC. Thus the equilibrium
wage does not signal the manager’s information and, therefore, the worker’s equilibrium belief is
the same as the prior one: (dm = 1;  1; 1j!  wC) = , (dm = 1;  2; 2j!  wC) = 1.
The manager’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ is then V1 = [p1 + (1  )q2](  wC)  c: We
now consider the manager’s deviations.
Suppose the manager deviates by inducing diﬀerent work decisions from the worker, while
adhering to the rest of the equilibrium strategy. First, the manager can induce dw = 1
only in state 1 by oﬀering wC in 1 only. The resulting expected payoﬀ for the manager is
V2 = p1( wC)+(1)r c: Second, the manager can induce dw = 1 only in state 2 by
oﬀering wC only in 2, realizing the expected payoﬀ V3 = r+(1)q2(wC)c: Third,
the manager can induce dw = 0 always by oﬀering 0 always, securing himself rc. However
this will be worse for the manager than choosing dm = 0 and inducing dw = 0, which leads to
the expected payoﬀ of V4 = r.
Next we can consider the manager’s deviations, C(i) =  j, i 6= j, while dm = 1 still.
Regardless of subsequent wage oﬀers and dw, the manager will not beneﬁt from this compared
to the above cases due to assumptions 1 to 3. The remaining cases involve dm = 0. First, the
manager can choose  1 and induce dw = 1 always by oﬀering wC always. The expected payoﬀ
in this case is V5 = [p1 +(1)p2](wC): Second, the manager can choose  2 and induce
dw = 1 always by oﬀering wC always. But this will be dominated by the above deviation due
to Assumption 1. Finally, the manager can secure himself V4 = r by oﬀering ! = 0 always
regardless of project choice.
For outcome (MD2 = C1) to be implementable under delegation, we need V1  Vk;
for k = 2;:::;5: These conditions are: V1  V2 ()  
q2wC
∆q2  1; V1  V3 ()  
p1wC
∆p1  2; V1  V4 ()  
[p1+(1)q2]wC+c
∆p1+(1)∆q2  3; V1  V5 ()   c
(1)(q2p2) + wC 
4: Recall that, under the centralized equilibrium implementing the same outcome as the
current one, the equilibrium payment to the manager was sC = c
(1)(q2p2), hence 4 =
sC + wC. Since the equilibrium payment to the manager is minimum  that satisﬁes  
maxf1;2;3;4g, the cost of implementing the same outcome is not smaller under delegation
than under centralization. Therefore the principal is never better oﬀ under delegation. This
completes the proof for the case (MD2 = C1) is implemented.
Remaining cases are (MD3 = C2) and (MD4 = C3). The second case can be implemented
under delegation trivially by setting  = 0, leading to the same expected payoﬀ for the principal
23as centralization. To implement the ﬁrst case under delegation, it is easy to see that  > ˜ !
where ˜ ! = `
∆p1+(1)∆p2 is the equilibrium wage for the worker, which, along with sC = 0,
implements the same outcome under centralization. Since the same outcome is implemented
at a lower cost under centralization, the principal is worse oﬀ under delegation.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: An optimal contract is minimum (;!1) satisfying (6), (12),
(13) and (14). Clearly any optimal contract satisﬁes  =
p1
∆p1!1 + c
∆p1. That is, the man-
ager’s optimal contract is determined by constraint (14), once the worker’s optimal contract
is determined. Note ﬁrst that the minimum value of !1 satisfying the worker’s incentive con-
straint (6) is !  `
∆p1. This ! is the minimum wage for the worker that supports (MD1) as
the equilibrium outcome, which will be compared with the minimum value of !1 that satisﬁes
the manager’s incentive constraints (12), (13) and (14). The set of (;!1) satisfying (12), (13)







this intersection is nonempty, bounded below and unbounded above. By setting (12) and (13)
as equalities and solving for !1, we obtain !11 
c∆q2
(1)(q2p2)r. Similarly, from (12) and (14),
we have !12 
c∆q2
(p1q2)r and, from (13) and (14), we have !13 
c[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r . We divide
the discussion into two cases: !11 > !12 or !11  !12.
Suppose !11 > !12 or, equivalently, p1 + (1  )p2 > q2 ,  >
q2p2
p1p2. In this case,
!13 is the minimum value of !1 satisfying constraints (12), (13) and (14), with (12) being a
nonbinding constraint. Since the optimal contract for the worker is minf!;!13g, we have: (a)
If !13 > ! or ` <
c∆p1[∆p1+(1)∆p2]
(1)(p1p2)r  `1(), then !1 = !13; (b) If !13  ! or `  `1(),
then !1 = !. Suppose next !11  !12 or, equivalently, p1 + (1  )p2  q2 ,  
q2p2
p1p2.
In this case, !12 is the minimum value of !1 satisfying constraints (12), (13) and (14), with
(13) being a nonbinding constraint. Since the optimal contract for the worker is minf!;!12g,
we have: (c) If !12 > ! or ` <
c∆p1∆q2
(p1q2)r  `2(), then !1 = !12; (d) If !12  ! or `  `2(),
then !1 = !.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: Consider ﬁrst the worker’s expected payoﬀs: UD = r`
∆p1,
UC1 = r`
∆p1+(1)∆q2. Since ∆p1 > ∆q2, we have UD < UC1. For the manager, VD 
VC1 = p1(  !  sC) + (1  )(r  q2sC) where  = c
∆p1 +
p1`
(∆p1)2, ! = `
∆p1
and sC = c
(1)(q2p2). Substituting , ! and sC into VD  VC1 leads to VD  VC1 =
p1r









p1r : Therefore, VD  VC1





(1)(p1p2)r  `1(), or  
q2p2
p1p2 and ` 
c∆p1∆q2
(p1q2)r  `2(). Suppose ﬁrst
 >
q2p2
p1p2 and `  `1(). It can be shown that  >
q2p2
p1p2 implies ˆ `() > `1(), from which
(b) follows. Suppose next  
q2p2
p1p2 and `  `2(). Proceeding similarly as before, it can be
shown that ˆ `()  `2() if  
q2p2
p1p2. Therefore, if `  `2(), we must have VD  VC1.
24PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: One can show that @ZC1
@` = 
p1+(1)q2




(∆p1)2 < 0. Thus both ZC1 and ZD decrease linearly in `. Diﬀerentiating with respect










∆p1 > 0. Since @ZC1
@`  @ZD
@` > 0 when
 = 1, there must be ˜  < 1 such that @ZC1
@`  @ZD
@` for all   ˜ . If p1∆q2r  (∆p1)2q2 < 0,
then @ZC1
@`  @ZD
@` < 0 when  = 0, from which the second part follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: Since the worker has the same information as the principal
when oﬀering contracts to the manager, the set of outcomes that can be implemented under
worker delegation is the same as that under centralization, (C1), (C2) and (C3). Let !D be
the principal’s payment to the worker and D be the worker’s payment to the manager in
case of success. Outcome (C3) can be trivially implemented with !D = D = 0, hence worker
delegation and centralization are equivalent in this case.
Consider outcome (C1). Recall that the equilibrium contracts implementing outcome
(C1) under centralization are sC = c
(1)(q2p2) and wC = `
∆p1+(1)∆q2. Given !D and
delegated authority, the worker faces three options. First, he can indeed implement outcome
(C1) by paying the manager D = sC = c
(1)(q2p2) for success, leaving himself !D  sC.
His expected payoﬀ in this case is U1 = [p1 + (1  )q2](!D  sC)  `. Second, he can
implement outcome (C2) by oﬀering 0 to the manager, securing himself the expected payoﬀ of
U2 = [p1 + (1  )p2]!D  `: Third, the worker can implement outcome (C3) again oﬀering
0 to the manager, and the resulting expected payoﬀ is U3 = r!D. For the equilibrium of the
subcontracting game to implement outcome (C1), we must have U1  maxfU2;U3g. This






∆p1+(1)∆q2 > sC + wC. Since the same outcome is
implemented at larger costs under worker delegation, the principal is strictly worse oﬀ.
A similar argument shows that the principal can implement outcome (C2) under worker
delegation with !D = `
∆p1+(1)∆p2, the same wage that implements outcome (C2) under
centralization. Thus worker delegation and centralization are equivalent in this case.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: We will show this only for the case of manager delegation. The
case of worker delegation is similar. To show that the principal is weakly better oﬀ under cen-
tralization, it is suﬃcient to show that any outcome that can be implemented under manager
delegation can be implemented under centralization at the same expected costs. Let (s
1;s
2) be
the optimal contract for the manager under delegation where s
i is the payment to the manager
when project i is chosen and successful. Let (w
1;w
2) be the optimal contract for the worker
that the manager oﬀers in the subcontracting stage. Again w
i denotes the payment to the
worker when project i is chosen and successful. Given the outcome (dm;C;dw) and contracts
f(w1;w2);(s1;s2)g, let EU(dm;C;dw;w1;w2) and EV (dm;C;dw;s1  w1;s2  w2) be the ex-
pected payoﬀ for the worker and the manager, respectively. Suppose the equilibrium outcome
under delegation is (d
m;C;d








2) 2 argmax(dm;C;w1;w2)EV (dm;C;d
w;s
1  w1;s
2  w2): It is straightforward





2) for the manager and (w
1;w
2) for the worker.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the Manager’s Expected Payoffs 
 